school had given an exaggerated importance to proteids as compared with carbohydrates. Chittenden proved that students, athletes and soldiers in camp can reduce their albumen rations to 50 to 60 grm. a day, corresponding to 8'5 to 9 5 grm. of nitrogen, without the slightest disturbance of their metabolism or general health, and even obtain an increase of body-weight. This is less than one-third of the German nitrogen ration for strenuous work. Chittenden's researches have been repeated with approximately the same results by many physiologists. The average amount of albumen accepted as necessary by modern biologists is 1 grm. per kilo of weight. The whole surplus ingested is pure waste, and represents an excess of work for the intestines, liver and kidneys. A young man, aged uiider 25, in course of development, as the soldier generally is, would require a small increase in the above amount. The fundamental principle governing the modern theory of alimentation is that the function of albumen is a constructive one; that is to say, it goes to replace the waste of the tissues. The normal heat-producing foods supplying the necessary energy for muscular work are fat and carbohydrates. The amount of carbohydrates which can be assimilated by the organism is almost unlimited, as the excess goes to create the glycogen reserves which are at the disposal of the organism as necessity arises. It follows that the work ration has mainly to be based on a large supply of carbohydrates in the form of starch, which, by the way, is also always and everywhere far more economical than animal proteids.
So far as I know these results have not yet been applied in the armies, all of which have adopted rations containing a vast excess of proteids, in many cases surpassing the numbers given by the German school. While 100 grm. of proteid might be considered amply sufficient, the old war ration in Italy contained 151 grm. of animal protein. The same is the case in France; in Germany the rations reached 181 grm. of albumen; in England the enormous amount -of 256 grm.' The differences between these quantities are so great that they cannot be accounted for by the different needs created by race and habit. The physiological error is probably attenuated by the fact that the soldier does not eat the whole of his ration.
These data I have taken from the report which General Rho submitted to the First Inter-allied Medical Conference held in Paris. From the facts which were brought to light in the discussion following the delivery of this paper, it appears that the number given for the proteid amount in the British Army ration is incorrect. It also appears that the quantity of animal protein in the British ration has been considerably reduced since the beginning of the War.
These short notes will suffice to justify the steps which have been taken to institute a more rational feeding of the Italian Army and Navy, founded on modern scientific facts. The question was raised in Italy as far back as 1912, during the Italo-Turkish War, by General Rho, the head of the medical department of the Italian Navy, but no decision was taken at the time. However the present war is in many respects a great teacher. The enormous increase in meat consumption in Italy, following upon the general mobilization, produced at once a rapid diminution of the live-stocks of the country, which acted better than scientific arguments in promoting an examination of the new point of view. A committee of physiologists and military hygienists was brought together to investigate the whole question and inspect the depots, barracks, shops, &c., in order to ascertain the conditions under which the ration was consumed.' Their conclusions were so clear and striking that they were at once accepted, and the amount of animal protein in the ration was brought down to a judicious limit, allowing for a wide margin beyond the theoretical data. The present ration corresponds to 3,300 calories per day; with the exception of the troops operating in the mountains during the winter months, for whom an increase has been provided.
With the diminution of the meat, substitutes such as cheese were also introduced in small quantities, and the ration was rendered more varied and palatable. The change was adopted in April, 1916, and the reports from the Front and from the Navy have been without exception entirely favourable. I may add that many military doctors have made the former excess of meat in the diet of the soldier responsible for various dyscrasic diseases, such as eczema and scurvy, which have of late become much more rare.
The saving effected in the slaughter of cattle by the new diet amounts to over one million head per year. Recently, owing to the general scarcity of food in the country, an experiment was made to reduce still further the ration of the Italian soldier. We tried to substitute for the meat an equivalent amount of nitrogen in the form of cheese three days a week. But what was more important still, we reduced the bread amount in the ration. As was to be expected, the change very soon proved detrimental to the strVngth of the men, and we came back to the full ration. The present ration is composed of 700 grin. of bread; 350 grm. of fresh meat, which two At the Paris Conference mentioned above reports were submitted by Professor Colonel Baglioni.for the army, and by Colonel Belli for the navy. days a week is replaced by either 200 grm. of dried cod or 266 grm. of sausage; 150 grm. of macaronii or rice; 50 grm. of cheese; 150 grm. of potatoes or 80 grm. of dried vegetables; 200 grm. of fresh vegetables; 20 grm. of roasted coffee; 30 grm. of sugar; and about half a pint of wine. To this is added three times a week a portion of oranges or dried fruit. This ration contains about 80 grmi. of ahaimal proteid, and yields 3,300 calories.
With this ration, our army alone needs to-day the same amount of meat that was sufficient for the whole nation before the War, and the total amount consumed by the army is three times as large as the amount of meat consumed in Paris, with its 2,800,000 inhabitants. I do not propose to deal with the general organization of our medical services in Italy, which is practically the same as that of all the other armies in the field. My object will rather be to treat of some special problems which we have had to face at our Front. Some of them have been peculiar to the Italian Army; while some are shared in a larger or smaller degree with the other armiies. I will first give you a few statistical data which may be compared with the statistics of the British Army, which has been fighting under entirely different conditions. These data refer to the first year of the War on the Italian Front.
Thse excellent sanitary conditions of the Italian troops at the Front are proved by the low sick-rate. This in the first months was 2-7 per 1,000; and it has later improved to 1'59 per 1,000. This is a considerable improvement on the 4 per 1,000 which was averaged in recent wars.
The proportion of wounded in the total number of the fighting troops has been from 5 to 7 per cent., which is considerably lower than the average of from 10 to 15 per cent. in recent wars, and greatly below the 22'5 per cent. which Fischer anticipated owing to the perfection of armaments. This low percentage is undoubtedly due to the methods of the present war and the relative scarcity of fights in the open field. But the prevision as to the severity of the wounds was far below the reality. The wounds from artillery fire (including hand grenades) have gradually increased from 47 to 55 per cent. of the total of wounds, leaving only 39 per cent. for rifle bullets. And even this high percentage has been considerably exceeded in many of the single actions. Bayonet wounds average only I per cent. In the Russo-Japanese war artillery wounds were only 15 per cent., as against 8O per cent. rifle wounds and 5 per cent. bayonet wounds. The victims of asphyxiating gas in the second half of the first year of the War in Italy had reached a percentage of 5'6 of the total losses. If we now come to the gravity of the wounds we find in the first six months of the War 31'6 per cent. of serious wounds and 55'4 of slight wounds; in the second half of the year there is a notable improvement'; serious wounds decrease to 23'6 per cent. while the slight wounds rise to 63 per cent. The remaining 13 per cent. represent the very slight wounds needing no hospital treatment. Among the high percentage of serious wounds must be reckoned a large proportion of wounds of the head, chest, abdomen and pelvis, which represent nearly 40 per cent. of the total wounds. Finally, I will give the numbers of deaths in relation to wounded.
In the first six months we reckoned them to be: 5.47 killed dn the spot, and 11,2 early deaths in the field hospitals-making in all 167 deaths per 100 wounded. In the second half ofthe year we had 7T9 killed and 101 early deaths, making in all 18 deaths per 100 wounded. This percentage is much lower than in recent wars, in which it reached 25 killed per 100 wounded.1 So far I have been dealing with circumstances which are common to all the Allied Fronts. But in Italy we have had to fight on a Front of 470 miles in length, offering from the Alps to the sea the most varied climatic conditions, and above all every possibility of infection through contact with an enemy infested with all the epidemics of the Balkans. Besides this we had to deal with all the sanitary problems involved in the occupation of the enemy's territory where all local organization had ceased. We were well aware that the Austrian units on the Eastern or Isonzo Front were infected with cholera; therefore the outbreak of the epidemic among our own troops in the second month of the War was not unexpected. The first cases of cholera among Italian troops occurred in units occupying the trenches just captured from the enemy. The outbreak of this epidemic in a severe form was a serious complication, and added to the immense work of the early months of the War, in which every detail of the military organization was put to the severest strain. We were confronted by a triple problem: (1) We had to localize the outbreak and prevent its diffusion among the whole army;
(2) we had to provide for the isolation and cure of the patients; (3) we had to prevent the epidemic from spreading into Italy. The problem was faced and radically solved by the combined efforts of the civil and military sanitary organization, whose united efforts won what was perhaps one of the greatest battles of the whole war.
The epidemic broke out among the first line troops early in August, 1915. Before the infected troops could be recalled it was obviously necessary to clean out and disinfect the first line trenches which otherwise would have become a permanent source of contagion to any unit sent to replace them. For this undertaking the work of the newly-created Prophylactic Sections proved invaluable. These were composed of specially trained men under the orders of a medical officer, who systematically and thoroughly disinfected every new trench occupied by the troops, even before it had been organized for defence or had become relatively protected from enemy shells. Necessarily the disinfection had generally to be carried on under the enemy's fire. I cannot speak too highly of the courage and the coolness displayed by these units. The men who were found to be infected were at once removed and samples of the faeces collected from every man in the inspected area and sent for examination to the advanced bacteriological field laboratories, so as immediately to isolate the carriers. And always and everywhere we have noticed that the decrease of the epidemic follows at once upon the detection and isolation of the bacilli carriers. In regard to the technique of trench disinfection, it varies according to circumstances. In trenches dug in the earth which would at once have absorbed liquid disinfectants, lime powder is generally sprinkled, darkened of course with dust or earth, to avoid making the trench obvious to the enemy. In the trenches of a more permanent construction, lined with cement, the walls and floor are sprayed with carbolic or soda solutions or lime-water, or even with acid sublimate in 3 to 5 parts per 1,000. In regard to the parapets of stones, so frequent on the rocky ground over which we had to fight, the best measure is free irrigation with carbolic or creoline solutions.
The isolation and cure of the patients, the isolation and bacteriological examination of suspected cases, the quarantine and examination of every man belonging to an army unit in which cases of cholera have occurred, and the establishment of a protective zone to prevent the spread of the epidemic into the country at large are all parts of the prophylactic organization which has been strictly applied to all the troops operating at the Eastern and North-Eastern Front, to the workmen and also to the civil population of the districts where these troops are quartered.
The men sent back from an infected area fall naturally under three categories: those actually suffering from cholera, those sick from other causes or wounded, and those in a normal condition. The first are sent straight to the advanced isolation hospitals, whence after being clinically cured and recognized as free of bacteria, they pass into convalescent hospitals. Those suffering from non-contagious diseases have to spend six days in special quarantine hospitals, while their freedom from the germ is ascertained. Finally the men in normal health returning from the Front are obliged to pass through an observation station where they are bacteriologically examined and where their clothes and every object they carry are sterilized, while the men themselves are cleaned and freed from parasites. In regard to the kinds of disinfectants used, they vary according to the objects to be sterilized-whether of cloth, leather or metal. The disinfectants are either chemical, such as carbolic acid, caustic soda or lime, calcium hypochlorite, potassium soap, formaldehyde, sulphur dioxide, or physical-namely, dry heat and steam. If the men are found to be germ carriers they are sent to hospitals where they remain under observation until pronounced germ free. The annexed diagram ( fig. 1) gives a general idea of the distribution of the men back from infected areas of the Front. It shows the advanced zone; the zone to the rear of the armies; and the territorial zone. The men actually suffering from contagious disease are sent to the advanced medical stations [left-hand corner of diagram] ,whence they are dispatched to the isolation hospital; the men not recognized as actually infected are sent to the observation posts [centre of diagram], which are furnished with disinfecting apparatus, baths, laundry and bacteriological laboratory; whence those found to be negative are sent straight back to the territorial zone. The ordinary sick and wounded are sent to the advanced general medical station [right-hand corner of diagram]; those found to suffer from contagious disease being sent to the isolation hospital; and the remainder being forwarded to the observation hospital in the rear zone. Here the carriers are separated from those free from infection, the latter being sent to the territorial hospitals. We have also special isolation establishments for prisoners of war, where an identical treatment is undergone. Here, in a few days' time, the 18,000 prisoners taken in Gorizia and over 25,000 captured on the Bainsizza attack were all examined.
The interior of Italy is protected from contagion by an advanced quarantine zone and a second wider zone stretching along the foot of the Alps as far as Milan, and from Milan skirting the Apennines along the Via Emilia to the Adriatic. No quarantine zones until two separate examinations have been made, proving him to be germ free. The maps shown contain the territory of the two quarantine zones; the first (Isonzo zone) shows the chain of stations forming a filter for the men coming from the Isonzo. Each of these includes an observation station, a convalescent hospital, an isolation hospital, a bacteriological laboratory, baths, and a disinfecting instalment, &c. There were also three stations for the observation of Austrian prisoners at Cividale, Manzano, and Sant' Antonio. The second map shows the larger quarantine zone, stretching west as far as Milan, and south as far as Forli; the flags mark the quarantine hospitals. A similar quarantine zone has been drawn round Bari, for the troops returning from Albania and Macedonia. The movements of the civil population in the Isonzo districts occupied by our army were subjected to the same restrictions as were applied to the troops. These measures were supplemented by a strict surveillance of the drinking water, food, and hygienic conditions of the houses, barracks, &c. The supply of drinking water has required a special organization. Owing to the scarcity of springs on the tablelands to the north of Vicenza, by the Isonzo, and on the Carso, it became necessary to organize the transport of water by lorries or by pumps and water-pipes and by the building of reservoirs, &c. The troops on the Asiago tableland alone required 100,000 gallons of water per day.
It goes without saying that cholera vaccination is universally practised side by side with the typhoid and paratyphoid vaccination. The compulsory vaccinations in the army are performed in the following order:
(1) Small-pox vaccination.
(2) Anti-cholera vaccination. This is performed ten days after the small-pox vaccination, and is given in two doses at five days' distance from each other. The first dose is 1 c.c., and the second 2 c.c. The reaction is generally very slight. The cholera vaccination is repeated twice a year-in the spring and in the autumn. The strength of the vaccine has been gradually increased from 1,000 million to 8,000 million germs per cubic centimetre.
(3) Typhoid-paratyphoid vaccination. This is made with mixed vaccine and is given in three doses at intervals of eight to ten days, beginning seven days after the second anti-cholera vaccination. The first dose is 2 C.C., the second 1 c.c., axnd the third 1j c.c. The typhoidparatyphoid vaccination is practised once a year, between December and March. Themixed vaccine is prepared on the basis of 800 million Section of Epidemiology and State Medicine of typhoid bacilli, and 400 million of paratyphoid B per cubic centimetre.
The prophylactic organization hAs never interfered with the military operations, and it has been completely successful. It has even been possible to send the whole of the troops operating in the front line on winter leave for a fortnight, without any danger to the country from contagion. Not one case of cholera has appeared in the interior of Italy.
In 1915, in a few months' time, we had to deal with over 14,000 cases in the army. In the following year the cases amounted to only 170, due to small outbreaks in two units, which were at once arrested. This sanitary organization has been so successful that it has gradually been extended from the Isonzo to the other territories of war, giving us complete security against any sudden outbreak of contagious disease. The diagram ( fig. 2 ) illustrates the cholera epidemic between August 1, 1915, and January 31, 1916 . The upper lines represent the numbers of cases notified daily, the lower ones show the number of deaths. The epidemic had several distinct periods of activity, the first extending from August 1 to December 15, followed by an interval of rest. In October there was a new wave, and another period (the worst) in November. -In December it gradually subsided; and by the middle of January it was practically extinguished. Our military offensive on the Isonzo during these five months was so vigorously maintained that it is difficult to establish a connexion between these outbursts of the epidemic and the occupation of new ground wrested from the enemy. However I would like to draw attention to the fact that the November rise of the curve followed close upon our big general attack along the whole of the Isonzo front between October 21 and 27, during which period important ground was gained and over 5,000 Austrian prisoners were taken. I cannot close this subject without referring briefly to the tumultuous exodus of the Albanian, Montenegrin and Serbian populations and of the Serbian Army with its 22,000 Austrian prisoners. The urgency of the immediate removal of this vast crowd, owing to the pressure of the enemy, made it imnpossible to adopt any prophylactic measure before taking them on board the ships. Cholera, small-pox, typhus and dysentery raged among the crowd of people whose organisms had lost all power of resistance through t]4e eiceptional hardships they had endured. They were all taken to the Island of Asinara, on the northwest coast of Sardinia, and the first steps towards isolation and cure F-4a could only be taken during the voyage. Everything had to be improvised on the island to meet the sudden emergency. Whenthe crowd first arrived there were 200 deaths per'day; after three days eight per day; and ten days later the mortality was nil. This episode makes one of the finest pages in the sanitary history of the war.
Among other infectious diseases the most serious of all, because of their immediate bearing on the efficiency of the army and their later influence on the community, are venereal diseases, especially syphilis. It is a difficult question, in which the hygienist has to reckon with social ethics, which are often in opposition to the methods he would wish to see adopted. The measures naturally come under two headings-preventive and curative. The preventive measures consist in a vigilant surveillance of prostitutes, and the prohibition of wandering prostitutes to enter the main military centre of the war zone. The medical authorities have been invested with the power to ascertain, isolate, and treat diseased prostitutes. In the vast majority of cases, the women voluntarily accepted these measures and obviously profited thereby, so that compulsory internments are now quite exceptional. With this is associated a prophylactic treatment of the men who have exposed themselves to the possibility of infection. Finally, dispensaries for the ambulatory or sedentamy cure of venereal diseases are established wherever large numbers of troops are quartered. The results have been excellent. Cases of venereal infection contracted in the war zone have almost disappeared ; and practically the only cases we have to deal with are those of soldiers who have become infected during their leave.
More than ten years ago the Italian Navy had adopted similar measures which proved very useful. Even small naval units which have no doctor on board possess the necessary equipment for individual prophylaxis-namely, potash soap, calomel ointment, and permanganate for urethral injection. The prophylaxis is obligatory, and is enforced by very.simple means. Any infected man who is proved to have evaded the prophylactic treatment has to undergo a period of punishment as soon as he has been cured. There is of course no penalty for the man who has become infected in spite of the preventive measures. By these simple means cases of venereal diseases in the navy have been brought down to less than half of their former number, which was 136 cases per year and per 1,000 sailors. In a few ships where the measures were applied more vigorously the infection disappeared altogether for long periods at a time. Another subject which has always specially interested Italians is malaria. The plain of the lower Isonzo and the lagoons round Grado and the outskirts of Monfalcone have always had a bad reputation in this respect, which we have found entirely justified. But Italy was well prepared for this emergency owing to the long experience gained in the malarial districts of the Peninsula and the islands. There, however, the malaria was fought on the spot among a population belonging to the infected districts, whereas the problem in its relation to the army was entirely different. Here we had to deal with malaria patients who in the natural course of events would be sent to convalesce in their homes, scattered all over Italy, with the danger of creating centres of malaria where the infection had not previously existed. A certain occurrence in the territorial hospital of Voghera brought home to us the reality of this danger. A few cases of recurring malaria had been put in the wards, upon which followed an outbreak of primary infection among the other soldiers in the same wards, who had never been in the war zone or in other malarial zones. A search was instituted and revealed the existence of female anopheles gorged with blood. I must add that the territory of, Voghera had been so far entirely immune from malaria.
We also noticed in other territories the importation of various clinical forms of malaria which had not previously existed there by troops who had returned from Albania and Macedonia. It, therefore, became imperative to institute special hospitals for the isolation and cure of malarial patients. In regard to prophylactic measures the state of war made it difficult to carry out drainage and general sanitation to any great extent. We have, however, undertaken the work at Vallona and Taranto; while for the lagoons of the Isonzo we have resorted widely to the use of paraffin in the stagnant waters. Other preventive measures have been the netting of windows in barracks, and the distribution of large doses of quinine among the soldiers equally with the civil population. We give as much as 80 cg. of quinine bisulphate per day.
In the present year (1917) 250,000,000 tablets of quinine have already been provided for the purpose. An interesting fact relating to quinine prophylaxis is the complete disappearance of malaria in the islands of Maddalena and Caprera, off the Sardinian coast, following a long period of preventive immunization of all their inhabitants.
The problem of tuberculosis has become universally acute,owing to its increase in all the armies. I will not deal with it specially to-night, beyond mentioning that in common with our allies we have created special establishments for its early diagnosis, and for the isolation and treatment of the patients.
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In conclusion, I should like to tell you something of the medical school which we have founded in the war zone. No doubt in England you are faced by the same problem as we are of providing a sufficient supply of doctors for the future needs of the country. In Italy the average age at which students graduate in medicine is 24 to 26, which means that since the first day of the War every student of the last four terms became a soldier, and even if appointed to the Army Medical Services he has had little or no opportunity of gaining the knowledge, the experience and the training necessary for a medical man. The majority of the university professors and their assistants, especially if clinicians, had also taken service. Thus both professors and students were serving together in the army. Colonel Tusini, Professor of Surgery at the University of Parma, had the excellent idea of taking advantage of the fact and worked out an admirable organization of a medical school in the war zone, divided between the University of Padua and a large centre of field hospitals at the village of S. Giorgio di Nogaro, which was just far enough from the front not to be under fire. This plan was sanctioned by the General Staff of the Army and the Minister of Public Instruction, and was soon in working order. There was a first term in 1916 and a second in 1917, extending through the five winter months.
The School of S. Giorgio di Nogaro was housed mainly in specially built barracks. It had a staff consisting of a director, twenty-one professors from the universities of the kingdom, dealing with every subject usually taught in the medical schools, and as many assistants. During the first term 1,325 lectures were delivered. The total number of students for each term amounted to about 2,000, of which 1,200 belonged to the school of Padua and 800 to the camp of S. Giorgio. These 800 students of S. Giorgio were quartered in eight large barracks under the superintendence of a major and six subalterns. At the end of the first term we had 460 candidates for the degree, of whom 232 passed brilliantly, 68 obtained the maximumi of votes, and 26 passed with honours.
By the initiative of Lieutenant-Colonel Salvi, Professor of Anatomy of the University of Parma, and under the auspices of the Italian Red Cross, a collection of specimens is being made to demonstrate the anatomo-pathology and the traumatology of modern warfare. We have established two centres in the rear of the fighting line where the specimens are being collected and prepared for permanent conservation.
DISCUSSION.
The PRESIDENT (Dr. G. S. Buchanan) expressed the thanks of the Section to Cav. F. De Filippi for a most valuable paper. He would draw attention to two matters among many which specially invited discussion. The first was the reduction of the Italian soldiers' ration both in total calorie value and in protein constituents. Contrasting this ration with the British ration for troops in the fighting line it might be claimed that the Italian was sufficient physiologically, and that the excess of the British over the Italian was, physiologically, only so much waste. But first it must be established that the physiological basis is a sound one, and next it must be remembered that, so far, the British soldier had done very well on his excess. There is a considerable difference in the moral effect upon troops on the one hand of a ration which has to be accepted as the bare minimum which will permit a man to do good work and fight and .on the other hand of a ration which the soldier (whatever he may say about it) knows to be in fact an abundant ration which leaves him a margin. It had been stated that the sufficiency of the reduced Italian ration was largely determined by the putting into operation, along with the new scale, of specially good schemes of instruction as to cooking and the avoidance of waste, and, of the issue of appetizing condiments; it would be interesting to have information on these points. The statement that a reduction of meat corresponded to a reduction in scurvy, did not correspond with his experience in Mesopotamia, where fresh meat was a most valuable and sometimes the only available anti-scorbutic. The second matter noted for discussion was the system adopted for the prevention of cholera. The large scale of the laboratory work for detection of carriers was very striking. It seemed probable that the onset of the winter conditions was a most powerful aid to the reduction of cases, and acted partly directly by producing conditions unfavourable to the cholera bacillus, and partly indirectly by giving a period of natural quiescence of infection during which the medical service had time to turn round and complete the organization against the spread of the disease in the coming spring. In any case the Italian medical service was to be heartily congratulated on the success of the elaborate arrangements which had been so well described.
Dr. S. M. COPEMAN, F.R.S., opened the discussion, calling particular attention to the avoidance of waste of food which has been effected in home camps by administrative action since the beginning of the War, and to the satisfactory results which have ensued on the replacement of a portion of the daily ration issue by a money payment of 51d. per man, which by allowing of the purchase of fresh vegetables, extta jam, fresh or condensed milk, cheese, c., has had the effect of rendering possible useful variations in the dietary. He also referred to the serious consequences of epidemics of measles, mumps, whooping-cough and catarrhal diseases in young soldiers, and suggested that part of future prophylaxis of these diseases might consist of the routine use of inhalation spray chambers such as are employed in connexion with cerebrospinal fever carriers.
Professor E. H. STARLING, F.R.S.: I should like to make a few remarks on the subjeet of diet and especially on the dietary principles which inspired those who were responsible for drawing up the rations of the Italian Army. I would, in the first place, point out that the lecturer has evidently been supplied with ancient statistics with regard to the diet of the British Army. The British Field Service ration at the present time consists of protein, 168 grm., fat 190 grm., and carbohydrate 495 grim., with a total calorie value of-4,450. Although rich in protein, the British ration does not contain anything like the very large proportion stated by the lecturer. The Italian ration, which before the beginnaing of the War was 3,300 calories, with a meat ration of 2 kilos,l was cut down in February, 1917, to one with a calorie value of 3,000 and a weekly meat allowance of 1P65 kilos,l and it is stated that in this reduction the authorities were influenced by the work and writings of Chittenden. The lecturer has opposed Chittenden to the earlier German writers, Voit, Pettenkofer, and others; but Chittenden's conclusions are also opposed to the more recent and accurate work done by his fellow-countrymen, Atwater, Langworthy, Benedict, Lusk, and others. It is on the work of these physiologists and on that of Rubner in Germany and of Tigerstedt in Scandinavia, that our present very exact knowledge of the requirements of man are based. Chittenden laid down two main conclusions as resulting from his experiments:-(a) That a man does not require the amount of protein stated in the dietary tables aceepted at tha.t time, and that it is better if he reduces his daily intake of protein from, say, 120 grm. to 60 or 70 grm.
(b) That when the protein is thus diminished the daily calorie intake of the body can also be diminished without loss of efficiency and with gain to the general health.
It is this latter conclusion which has given rise to the most misunderotanding, and which, if acted upon, can be actually dangerous to the national safety of the Allies. Chittenden points out that he himself can keep in health and maintain his weight on a diet containing not more than 50 grm. protein and 2,000 daily calories. In this, however, there is no novelty; his colleague, Mendel, required 2,400 calories and 70 grm. of protein. Mendel is a man of average weight and this figure, 2,400, is the figure accepted by all authorities for the metabolic needs of a man of average weight leading a sedentary life.
Chittenden is a small, light man, past middle age, and leading the peaceful life of a savant. Great stress is laid on a series of experiments performed by Chittenden on a number of College athletes or soldiers, who on a diet with a diminished amount of protein, and in many cases a low calorie value, carried'
Including bone.
out their normal vocations including athletic exercises, physical drill, &c. The following points, however, should be remembered in drawing conclusions from these experiments. All the subjects lost weight. This was equivalent to adding a certain ration of their own fat to their daily diet, and this addition in the cases of one or two of them might amount to 100 to 200 calories per day. All are said to have suffered considerably from cold, although they were well housed, well clothed, and protected as far as possible from climatic exposure. At the end of the experiment all were trained " fine " and in every case they went back to their previous habits of diet. It was doubtful, in the case of the soldiers, whether recourse was not had to other foods as well as those accounted for in the diet tables. In no case was the actual amount of energy expended by the body measured-e.g., in the respiratory chamber. It is eviaent that these experiments can give us no guide as to the amount of food required by soldiers on active service, exposed to cold and wet, often forced to sleep in wet clothes, and called upon occasionally to carry out tasks involving muscular efforts to the very limit of their endurance. It must be remembered that all our figures on the energy expenditure of man are based on experiments carried out at a temperature of 15°to 200 C. According to Lefevre every drop of 5°C. means an increased energy output of 300 calories. The average requirements of an adult man of average weight in a sedentary occupation is about 2,450 calories. If he is exposed to cold his requirements go up. If he does physical work his requirements increase in proportion to the work done. An energy output of as much as 9,000 calories per day has been measured by Atwater in the respiratory chamber. This was in the case of extraordinarily heavy work done by a trained cyclist, but under more ordinary conditions of heavy work 6,000 calories per day is by no means an uncommon quantity. This was the average expenditure of energy per day by a party of ninety-six men engaged in cutting wood during the winter in Sweden, and the average diet of a lumberman's camp in Canada in the winter has been found to be as high as 8,000 calories. Lefevre has estimated his own output during fifteen hours' mountaineering at more than a million kilogrammemetres, the heat production reaching 835 calories per hour.
The allowance of 4,450 calories in the British Field Service ration cannot be regarded as in any way excessive under the circumstances of the case. Even though the soldier may put on fat on this allowance when he is back at rest, he will expend more than this energy per day when he is in the trenches and engaged in active operations; and it will be of advantage if he has a store of fat to fall back on to supplement the probably insufficient ration which he will be able to get under these conditions. The allowance of 3,000 calories per day in the Italian ration of February, 1917, must be regarded as quite inadequate, and we can but approve the recent increases which have been made in this ration. But it must be borne in mind that even the increased ration of about 3,300 calories affords practically no margin, especially for soldiers exposed to the arctic conditions existing at the present time on the mountain front. For these men the ration will require to be supplemented if they are not frequently withdrawn to the milder climate of the plains, where, under conditions of rest and warmth, they can replete the wasted energy of their bodies.
I would emphasize the fact that the need for energy is not a matter of theory. The observations of Tigerstedt, Atwater, and many others show that the output of the normal adult when at rest in bed at room temperature is 1 calorie per kilo of body weight an hour. At rest in waking hours it is not less' than 1-25 calories. The average weight of Italian soldiers may be put at 60 kilos. Given eight hours' sleep their minimum requirements are 1,680 calories, when no work is done. The ration leaves therefore 1,620 calories available for work conversion and for the maintenance of body temperature when exposed to cold. In such simple movements as those of pedalling a stationary bicycle, the efficiency of conversion is little more than 25 per cent. The ration of 3,300 only provides for work having a thermal equivalent of 405 calories, say 172,000 kilogramme-metres. Magnus-Levy and Blix have estimated the effective muscular work of the average mountain climber at from 30,000 to 60,000 kilogramme-metres an hour. One sees how easily the soldier on active service may be called upon for ain output in excess of the provision, even when the temperature is not reduced to the arctic conditions which at present exist on the mountain front. In the case of the British Army, it cannot be denied that, for men engaged in sedentary occupation-e.g., clerks, telephonists, and the artisans attached to the various industries which have grown up round our armies, the full service ration may be in excess of the requirements. The saving of food resulting from the appreciation of this fact does not prejudice the health of the man, and makes for the economy of the nation. Chittenden was perfectly correct in his conclusions that a man could retain health and perform work on a much smaller protein ration than is given in ordinary dietaries. Many other observers have conducted experiments which led to the same conclusion-viz., that the protein minimum is somewhere in the region of 30 to 35 grammes of protein per day. I should, however, dissent strongly from the conclusion that this reduction of protein is advantageous, although it may be -well to know that the protein of our diet could be reduced considerably if need arises without the entire cessation of the work of the country. It must be remembered, however, that if the protein is to be reduced to a minimum-i.e., to the amount wbich will just replace the tissue waste-the protein must be of high biological value, such as is contained -for instance in milk, meat and, strange to say, potatoes. If, as is normally the case, we draw the greater supply of our protein from cereals a larger proportion will be necessary. Various foreign proteins from our foods have to be dissociated into their constituent amino-acids in digestion, and -from the mixture of amino-acids thus formed the body has to pick out for purposes of repair just those acids in proper proportions which are necessary to recreate the proteins of the body. A considerable margin of protein is therefore necessary to provide for this transformation. Moreover, it has been shown by Abderhalden that, although men can be maintained in nitrogenous equilibrium on a diet containing only 5 grammes of nitrogen per day, the most trivial disorder, such as a cold in the head, upsets the balance and leads to a loss of nitrogen from the body. Such a result is the basis, in fact, of the ordinary statement that an excess of protein is necessary to increase our resistance to disease. But we do not need to trouble about the proportion of protein in our food so long as the latter represents a sufficient number of calories. Any of the mixtures of food which make up an ordinary diet will be found to contain something in the region of 100 grm. of protein with a diet of 3,000 calories. No army, nor large mass of men, could be fed on the carefully selected diets, including large quantities of cream, which were made use of by Chittenden in his experiments. But protein, especially meat protein, has certain further effects which may be of distinct advantage to an army. Protein is the only foodstuff which is burnt up in the body in proportion to its intake. The other two foodstuffs if they are assimilated in excess are laid down as glycogen or fat in the body. Increase of protein or meat leads to increased production of heat in the body and is analogous to stoking a furnace more vigorously. This excess of energy, liberated in consequence of a meal of meat, cannot be utilized for muscular work. In cold weather, however, it takes its part in maintaining the body temperature, so that a generous meat diet, in virtue both of its protein and its fat content, presents a distinct advantage when given to men who are exposed to extreme cold or to inclement weather. Finally, it must not be forgotten that the great majority of our soldiers are young men, many of whom have not yet finished growing, while a large proportion have had their previous growth retarded by insufficient food and insanitary conditions of housing. We have only to see the development, bodily, mental and moral, of these men during their six months' training to be convinced of the national advantages of a generous diet to the soldier. In war we pit the physique and moral of our men against those of the enemy and no effort is wasted which is aimed at the development of these qualities.
Brigadier-General MOLA (AMilitary Attache to the Italian Embassy in London) pointed out that thbre was a psychological aspect to be considered in the rationing of soldiers at the Front. The soldier must not be allowed to feel that food was being served out to him with stinginess; he was entitled to the generosity of the nation for which he risked his life. Where armies of the various allied countries were fighting side by side, as was at present the case in Italy, comparisons regarding the food supplied to his comrades were apt to depress the moral of the less favoured soldier. General Mola was of opinion that this element had had a good deal to do with the recent increase in the ration of the Italian soldier.
at SAGE Publications on June 21, 2016 jrs.sagepub.com Downloaded from Major R. FARRAR, R.A.M.C.(T.F.R.), said that as regards rations, there had been a very marked improvement in the feeding of troops in training in England. In the earlier months of the War there had been a prodigious amount of waste, particularly of bread and of meat, and whole loaves and good joints of meat were often to be seen in the swill-tubs. At the same time there was little variety, the food was indifferently cooked, and the soldier usually supplemented his rations by suppers of food purchased or sent to hiua by friends. Since then the ration has been reduced from 20 oz. to 14 oz. of bread, and from 16 oz. to 12 oz. of meat, but the army cooks have been well and carefully trained, and judicious expenditure of the 5id. allowed in lieu of rations enabled the provision of a generous and varied diet combined with a c6nsiderable amount of economy. He had recently analysed the " Economy Returns" and "A.B.48" 'forms of different units. In a large Training Reserve Brigade of Artillery containing about 2,000 men doing different classes of work, some light, some comparatively heavy, the economy effected by " under-drawing" amounted to about 1 per cent. of all classes of rations, and about 07 per cent. was saved out of the 56d. by underspending. The men received a good and varied diet, and were so well satisfied that only about half of them availed themselves of the excellent soup which was provided at 9 p.m. Economy in cooking was very carefully exercised; all'fat, even the grease left on plates, was carefully accounted for, and the dripping either used for cooking or in lieu of margarine, or sold to a contractor for munition purposes; bones were sold to the extent of about 12 per cent. by weight of the meat drawn; bread was scrupulously economized and the pieces left on the mess tables used either for rissoles or bread-puddings. Practically no consumable food was thrown away in this unit, and the swill-tubs contained, very little besides potato peelings and vegetable parings. He had carefully estimated the food purchased in canteens or outside shops by this unit and found that it amounted to about 3 oz. per head daily of farinaceous food in the shape of buns, &c.-a luxury consumption which would probably occur even if the bread ration were proportionately increased. The amount of proteid food purchased in the canteens was practically negligible. He had also compared two units, one a reserve unit of R.O.D. doing very light work-from one to two hours of moderate physical exertion daily-the other a Training School for N.C.O's., doing intensive training, which comprised six hours daily of the hardest possible physical training, all movements being done in doublequick time. In the former unit, that doing light work, economy of rations by " under-drawing " was effected to the extent of 5 per cent., in the latter rations were consumed to within 0'5 per cent. of the amount entitled. There was no waste, and the rations did not apparently fully satisfy the men's needs, for not only did the unit purchase food rather largely-to the extent of about is. per head daily from canteens and shops, but he had heard of them visiting other messes to obtain extra food. His investigations led him to the conclusion that the present h-ome-training ration was very closely and accurately calculated to the needs of men in training, and might even be slightly inadequate to the needs of men doing exceptionally hard physical work.
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Major Cav. F. DE FILIPPI: My paper is in no sense an original contribution, but only a synopsis of other people's work and conclusions without any additions of my own. After fifteen years' interruption of biological studies I feel myself diffident in arguing on physiological questions with such authorities as have taken part in the discussion. I venture, however, to add a few remarks to the interesting contribution of Professor Starling. It seems to me that Professor Starling has availed himself of the occasion to submit to a searching criticism the most extreme conclusions of Chittenden and his school. Fortunately no army has been made the subject of a physiological experiment, and there is no relation between the figures of Chittenden and the actual quantities of protein adopted for the Italian Army. Professor Starling has made the main point of his discussion the total amount of calories needed to meet the requirements of the fighting soldier; whereas the chief argument treated in the paper' was the amount of protein proportionate to carbohydrates in the ration. On that special point there seems to be no real difference of opinion. The discussion has certainly brought to light that a very considerable reduction has been made in the meat quantities of the ration adopted for the British Army at the beginniing of the War. In regard to the total number of calories necessary to meet the requirements of the fighting man, I do not consider-that it can possibly be greater than the amount needed for men engaged in the exploration of unmapped high mountain ranges. In the expeditions of the Duke of the Abruzzi, and in the one which I myself recently led in the Himalaya and Karakoram, a ration was adopted containing 3,500 calories, which proved amply sufficient for all, including the two Englishmen who were part of the last-named enterprise.
